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Abstract
This paper offers an exploration of various facets of the Israeli-Russian political relationship.
The positive relationship between the two states seems unlikely considering each state’s
history and strategic alliances, though Israel and Russia have endeavored towards a strong
working relationship since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. This
paper first explores the history of the relationship between the former Soviet Union/Russia
and Israel from the formation of Israel in 1948 to the present day. The historical arc is used in
an attempt to explain the development of the current relationship. Next, this paper explains
the current status of the relationship, particularly through Vladimir Putin’s leadership of
Russia and his diplomatic relationship with Israeli leaders Ariel Sharon and Benjamin
Netanyahu. I then turn to the multiple facets of the strategic alliance, including military,
economic, technological, and cultural partnerships. Lastly, this paper summarizes the
implications of the Israeli-Russian alliance on Middle Eastern and international geopolitics.
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Preface
As I contemplated my Independent Study Project, the relationship between Israel and
Russia was nowhere near my mind. In fact, I had no idea that such a relationship existed. I
believed that Israel felt the same way as Western Europe and the United States in regarding
Russia. The topic came to my intention one day during class at the SIT office when Dr.
Csurgai mentioned the growing alliance between Israel and Russia. He chuckled, adding,
“That would make a great ISP.” From then, my interest was piqued and I began my initial
research.
Now, two months later, I feel I have added to the academic literature on the topic. The
relationship is fascinating, especially considering the history and environments in both Israel
and Russia. Like the idea for my project, the alliance is unexpected, but surprisingly satisfying
to research and on which to report. I must thank Dr. Csurgai for inspiring me to this topic, as
it is research I hope to continue when I return to the United States.
In the end, the Israeli-Russo relationship should be examined for its uniqueness and
additions to world politics. My examination of the topic has changed my perspective on the
Middle East, and I hope my work inspires further exploration, too.
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Introduction
Without the Soviet Union, Israel’s formation in 1947 and independence on 14 May
1948 would have been impossible. However, the Soviet Union’s support for a Zionist state
and the Partition Plan seems to directly contradict the rampant anti-Semitism present in the
former Soviet Union, as well as Russia’s positive relationships with Arab states in the Middle
East. The relationship between Israel and Russia came to a halt during the 1950s1, and
remained at a standstill until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Despite
the lingering differences in philosophy and ideology, Russia and Israel have constructed a
strategic alliance, impressively strong since Russia’s diplomatic re-recognition of Israel in
1991.2
The relationship is complex and multifaceted, including diplomatic support, military
contracts and practice, cultural and customs unions, technological cooperation, and energy
contracts. Additionally, Israel became the number one destination for post-Soviet Union Jew
migration, thus a large Russian-Jewish diaspora exists in Israel. In fact, Israel absorbed over
one million Russian Jews, whom increased Israel’s population by approximately eighteen
percent.3 The diaspora community has kept its networks in Russia, therefore increasing the
connections between the two states.
This paper seeks to explain the development of the current relationship by examining
history, recognizing both the depth and breadth of the current alliance between Israel and
Russia. Through an understanding of the diplomatic relations between Israel and Russia, this

1

Mark N. Katz, “Putin’s Pro-Israel Policy,” Middle East Quarterly 12 (2005): 51.
“A Hazy Landmark,” Transitions Online, 2 May 2005.
3
Larissa Remennick, “Transnational community in the making: Russian Jewish immigrants of the 1990s in
Israel,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 28 (2002): 516.

2
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paper will show the implications of this relationship for the geopolitics of the Middle East,
particularly relating to the United States of America.
I begin with the history of Israel, the early relationship between the Jewish Agency
and the Soviet Union, through the 1990s and to the current status under Vladimir Putin and
Benjamin Netanyahu. Through this history, I will show the growth of the relationship and the
motivating factors for continued development. Next, I turn towards the Russian diaspora in
Israel. I will explain how the diaspora has influenced the development of Israel, Israeli
culture, and lobbied for continued relations with Russia despite the anti-Semitism in their
former homeland. Then, I will explain the strategic partnerships between the two nations:
military, technological, energy, and cultural. Each of these subsections highlights the extent of
Russia’s involvement in Israel and vice-versa. This paper will conclude with an explanation
of the geopolitical situation in the Middle East regarding Israel, Russia, and the United States.
The Israeli-Russian relationship is unexpected, but verifiably functional and robust in the
world political arena.
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Literature Review
The literature available for this topic was limited, though there was certainly enough
academic literature to form a comprehensive perspective on Israeli-Russo relations. In
general, I believe the relationship between these two states has flown under the radar, thus the
restricted nature of previous academic analysis.
My first set of sources is historical, academic articles. These journals provide a history
of the relationship, mostly from the strategic perspective of the Soviet Union. As Israel was a
fledgling country, the literature suggests that almost any alliance would have been helpful; the
Soviet Union, however, walked a tenuous line after World War II and into the 1990s, thus the
relationship has been framed as a strategic move on the part of the former Soviet Union and
Russia. Only the more recent literature has addressed the Israeli benefits of this relationship.
The second set of sources is also historical, but focus on sociological and
anthropological information. The Russian-Jewish diaspora in Israel has had a profound effect
on the relationship between the two countries, as well as Israeli internal politics. I used these
articles to develop my understanding of the cultural relationship between the two, in addition
to the fundamental internal forces driving the relationship. These sociological and
anthropological articles describe the Russian diaspora and the Israeli absorption of over one
million Russian-Jews.4 Understandably, these works are only from the Israeli perspective.
The third and final set of sources I utilize is news articles, mostly recent, that comment
equally on Israel and Russia’s motives in the relationship. These articles show the
“landmarks” of recent relations, especially new contracts, diplomatic trips, and customs
agreements. Through this variety of articles, I pieced together a landscape of modern IsraeliRussian relations. The news articles paint the relationship in both a positive and negative
4

Mark N. Katz, “Putin’s Pro-Israel Policy,” 57.
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light. For example, some Israeli news sources call for attentiveness towards the relationship,
stating that the strategic alliance may benefit Russia more than Israel.5 Others point to
Russia’s continued relationship with Israel’s enemies: Iran and Saudi Arabia. On the opposing
side, these articles promote the relationship by highlighting the similarities between the
Russian government and Israeli government, as well as each state’s devotion to fighting
broadly defined “terrorism” both at home and abroad.6
Within the past five years, there have been a few books written on the strategic
alliance between these two states, though I was unable to gain access to these materials
through either inter-library loan or the United Nations library at Geneva. These books are
comprehensive, and should be considered in a complete analysis of the Israeli-Russian
relationship. However, the newness of these books as well as the limited nature of the
academic literature suggests that this subject must be explored in greater depth. I hope that
this academic work may be used as a guide and amalgamation of current information.

5

Azriel Bermant, “Israel should beware ally Russia,” The Jewish Chronicle Online, 23 September 2014.
Dorit Goldender, “Russia and Israel: Strategic Partners that Sing the Same Folk Songs,” International Affairs
(Moscow) 17 (2011): 124.

6
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Research Methodology
My academic research was conducted primarily through the examination of academic
and news articles available from reputable academic search catalogs. The articles are from a
variety of sources, providing a broad perspective on my topic. The news articles were not
academic sources, but were verified and used to piece together the current state of affairs
between Israel and Russia. The research, therefore, was primarily qualitative and not
quantitative.
A majority of my work was conducted at the United Nations Library in Geneva,
Switzerland, as well as in Nyon, Switzerland and Commugny, Switzerland. Most sources
came from online catalogs accessed through my membership with DePauw University’s
databases, though a few were found through InterLibrary Loan and with help from the staff at
the United Nations Library.
In addition, I conducted four interviews in conjunction with my analysis of written
works. I attempted to interview a variety of individuals: a professor and expert in Middle
Eastern Studies, Dr. Jubin Goodarzi; a Russian Jew who emigrated from Russia during the
1980s, Mr. Alex Safronsky; a former journalist with knowledge on the relationship, Mr. Noel
Howell; and expert on Soviet Union/Russian foreign policy, my anonymous interviewee.
Each of these interviews lasted between forty-five minutes and an hour and took place near
Geneva, Switzerland. There were no specific ethical concerns in my research, though I
addressed the ethical considerations of anonymity, confidentiality, and direct quoting
specifically during each of my interviews.
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History of Israeli-Russia Relations
Since the early 20th century, the Israeli-Arab conflict has led to the Jewish question:
should Israel be an independent state? Some Jews turned towards Zionism, the nationalist
belief dictating the creation and continuation of an Israeli homeland and the right of return for
all Jewish people.7 This question divided states into two groups: those supporting the twostate solution, and those supporting an Arab nation, not an Israeli-Arab nation. During World
War II, the Soviet Union annexed large parts of Eastern Europe, bringing over two million
Jews into the USSR.8 The Soviet Union, however, took a contradictory position on the Jewish
question. They supported Zionism in the case of Israel, but perpetuated deep and
institutionalized anti-Semitism at home. Jews were removed from political leadership and
most Jewish and Yiddish-speaking cultural institutions were closed.
Before the second World War, Stalin suggested a combination Jewish-Arab state, but
the official position of the Soviet Union switched as the post-World War II “Great Power”
struggle became evident.9 The USSR was faced with combatting the United States and Great
Britain for global hegemony, and the Middle East was quickly becoming the arena for that
fight. Lauren Rucker suggests that, “Moscow concluded that if the Soviet Union was to
succeed in weakening Great Britain in the Middle East, the Zionist movement was the only
means of doing so.”10 The choice to support Israel, therefore, had little to do with Zionist
ideology, but rather the Soviet Union’s self-interest and provisions to continue its role as a
world power. Stalin viewed Zionism as a political tool, and manipulated the world stage to

7

Gideon Lichfield, “Russia Invades the Middle East,” New Statesman 134 (2005): 34.
Laurent Rucker, “Moscow’s Surprise: The Soviet-Israeli Alliance of 1947-1949” (working paper, Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars), 1.
9
Anonymous, interview by Megan Bailey, 14 November 2014.
10
Rucker, “Moscow’s Surprise,” 33.

8

Bailey 12

use it as such. In April 1947, the then Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko
announced the USSR’s newfound support for an independent Jewish state.11
On 29 November 1947, the United Nations held a vote in consideration of the twostate plan: the creation of Palestine and Israel and the end of British mandate.12 The Soviet
Union voted yes, while also ensuring the votes of Belarus, Ukraine, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia. With coercion and political strategy, the Soviet Union almost guaranteed the
creation of Israel, the Zionist state. In May 1948, the USSR became the first country to grant
the newly founded Israel with de jure recognition.13 Moscow’s support continued when Israel
suggested an arms contract in late 1948. Israel and Russia sent diplomatic envoys back and
forth, and some Israeli ambassadors suggested outward support for the USSR in the Cold
War. Israel stayed in the Soviet Union’s good graces until the early 1950s, when all relations
came to a halt. Stalin had allowed the relationship to continue because he calculated that the
benefits of an Israeli relationship outweighed the costs14; this attitude distorted as Israel turned
Westward and the status quo in the Middle East shifted.
In the 1950s and 1960s, a myriad of Arab regimes with nationalist and socialist
ideologies rippled through the Middle East. Iraq ended its monarchy in 1958; Syria’s revolt
was complete by 1963; many others followed suit.15 Israel’s alliance no longer appealed to the
Soviet Union, as it instead envisioned a Middle East of socialist nations with the USSR as
their model. With Israel planted firmly in Western hands, particularly those of the United
States, Moscow found it necessary to take action to secure their role as a Great Power as the
11

Vladislav Zubok, “The Soviet Union and the Establishment of Israel,” in Harry S. Truman, the State of Israel,
and the Quest for Peace in the Middle East, ed. Michael J. Devine (Kirksville, MO: Truman State University
Press, 2009), 76.
12
Rucker, “Moscow’s Surprise,” 20.
13
Anonymous, 14 November 2014.
14
Rucker, “Moscow’s Surprise,” 36.
15
Jubin Goodarzi, interview by Megan Bailey, 11 November 2014.
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Cold War escalated. “The competition and rivalry of the superpowers in the Middle East was
a central, if not dominant theme, in international relations.”16 The USSR gained the alliance of
numerous Arab countries as it shifted its focus from Israel: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and
Turkey. By the 1970s, the Soviet Union was the number one supplier of arms to the Middle
East, though Israel relied first on France, and then the United States to provide its weapons.17
Though the Soviet Union had supported Zionism during Israel’s creation, it declared
Zionism as a form of racism in the 1960s. The opinion intensified in conjunction with the
mounting tensions in the Middle East, especially with the Six-Day War, during which
Moscow supported the Arab side.18 The KGB circulated propaganda with anti-Zionist
messages and a majority of these pamphlets condemned Zionism as the next Nazism.19 Yuri
Ivanavov, a popular Soviet propagandist, published numerous works declaring that Zionism
was the next big world threat, that it was implementing a class system, and “dividing the
Israeli working people by which the ruling class ensures itself freedom of maneuver and
effective control and the opportunity to incite and fan racialism.”20 Despite the large Jewish
population in the Soviet Union and the USSR’s anti-Semitic sentiments, no Russian Jews
were allowed to immigrate to Israel. The Soviet Union voted yes on the 1975 United Nations
Resolution 3379, which declared Zionism as racism and affirmed Palestine’s role as an
observer nation in the United Nations General Assembly.21 This resolution was revoked in
1991, aligning with the disbanding of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

16

Bernard Reich and Stephen Gotowicki. “The United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East,” in The
Decline of the Soviet Union and the Transformation of the Middle East, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.
17
Goodarzi, 11 November 2014.
18
Mark N. Katz, “Putin’s Pro-Israel Policy,” 51.
19
Yuri Ivanov, “CAUTION: ZIONISM! Essays on the ideology, practice, and organisation of Zionism,”
Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970.
20
Ibid.
21
Reich and Gotowicki, “The United States and the Soviet Union.”
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The relationship between Israel and the Soviet Union remained non-existent until 1987
when President Mikhail Gorbachev declared, “that the absence of diplomatic relations
between the Soviet Union and Israel cannot be considered normal.”22 In following his
glasnost, Gorbachev sent multiple diplomatic envoys to Jerusalem; these meetings were
widely publicized and took place amongst all levels of Israeli society.23 Gorbachev’s motives
were still strategic. The United States had a firm hold on Israel and had involved itself in the
intensifying Arab-Israeli conflict. Its status as a Great Power was secured by its position as an
arbitrator between the two groups. Since coming to office, Gorbachev had improved relations
with numerous Middle Eastern countries, all in line with his idea of perestroika: Oman,
Kuwait, Yemen, Jordan, and Egypt.24 The final connection was Israel, which Gorbachev knew
was necessary for Moscow to ever play a role in the peace process. Procuring Israel was
equated to a secure position in the Middle East and in the world. The Soviet Union wanted to
“portray itself as indispensible: to the Arabs, as the only country to press Washington…and to
the Americans, as the only party to bring the Arabs to the table.”25 Israel gladly accepted
Moscow’s outreached hand, especially as Gorbachev thawed the strict immigration
restrictions.
Diplomatic relations continued to improve after the Soviet Union disintegrated in late
1991 and Boris Yeltsin came to power. As Yeltsin attempted to unify Russia’s political
parties, most international policies were made to remedy internal politics, too. After coming
to power, Yeltsin faced three distinct groups in Russian politics: the pro-Western group that
promoted privatization; the centralist group that emphasized Eurasian relations and a slow

22

Galia Golan, “Gorbachev’s Middle East Strategy,” The New York Times, Fall 1987.
Anonymous, 14 November 2014.
24
Robert O. Freedman, “Russia and Israel under Yeltsin,” Israel Studies 3 (1998): 150.
25
Golan, “Gorbachev’s.”
23
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privatization; and the “old-line” communists who wanted to resume Russia’s role as a world
power.26 To appease the internal forces, Yeltsin agreed with Gorbachev’s idea that Russia
must have a role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. The easiest solution was a renewal of full
diplomatic relations with Israel.
In 1992, Israeli and Russian diplomats signed an agreement to promote the
development of Israeli-Russo relations, including political, legal, economic, and cultural
cooperation, as well joint investment projects.27 Trade between the two states began and, by
the late 1990s, Israel had become Russia’s largest trading partner in the Middle East. The two
discussed Russian pipelines to Israel to promote energy security and worked jointly on an
early-warning aircraft. On 17 October 1996, Moscow reinstated the Jewish agency’s ability to
operate in Russia.28 The Jewish agency was helpful in Russian Jew immigration: “very well
organized, teaches the Jews about Israel and Hebrew, buys them tickets, and helps them
leave.”29 Russia certainly had motives to engage with the Israeli government, but Israel
enjoyed benefits from the relationship as well. Israel received a steady flow of immigrants,
developed a beneficial and lucrative trade relationship, believed Russia could prove an evenhanded mediator in the conflict with Palestine, and hoped the relationship would dissuade
Russia from providing nuclear assistance to Arab nations.
The Israeli-Russo relation was only fully normalized in 1997, though the process was
not without conflict. Russia opened a mission to Palestine Authority in an attempt to be fair,
and even invited both Palestine and Israel’s leaders to Moscow to demonstrate their

26

Freedman, “Russia and Israel under Yeltsin,” 142.
Freedman, “Russia and Israel under Yeltsin,”150.
28
Ibid, 157.
29
Ibid, 156.
27
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centrality.30 Despite Israel’s motivation to continue their alliance with Russia, Moscow
continued to provide nuclear technological support to Iran as well as send missile technology
to Syria. This angered Israel, but the economic ties were too important to warrant and end to
the alliance. In 1997, Russia denounced Israel’s actions against Hezbollah and blamed Israel
for deadlock in the Arab-Israeli peace process.31 Without a relationship with Israel, Russia
would still have a legitimate role in the peace process considering its proximity, security
interests, and “long-standing connections with many other states in the region.”32
Even so, the Israeli-Russian relationship continued without as much as a hiccup. In
addition to the large number of immigrants, extensive tourism between the two began.
Russian newspapers began publications for the Russian-Jewish diaspora in Israel; in October
1996 Jerusalem agreed to build a house of Russian culture in Israel.33 Boris Yeltsin became
the first Russian head-of-state to visit Israel, though he was no longer in office during his
2000 visit.34 Vladimir Putin was the first serving president to visit Israel; his 2005 trip
signified a complete reversal in the Soviet-Israeli relationship.

30

Ibid, 155.
Robert O. Freedman, “Israeli-Russia Relations since the Collapse of the Soviet Union,” Middle East Journal
49 (1995): 244.
32
Reich and Gotowicki, “The United States and the Soviet Union.”
33
Freedman, “Russia and Israel under Yeltsin,” 164.
34
“A Hazy Landmark.”
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Modern Relations
In early 2014, Vladimir Putin expressed his wishes to continue support for Israel: “the
development of a mutually advantageous and constructive relations with Israel in the political,
economic, humanitarian, and other fields will remain the priority of Russia’s foreign
policy.”35 Indeed, since Putin took power in 1999, the Russian relationship with Israel has
grown firmly into a strategic alliance. Trade has grown, the two states have signed numerous
cultural and technological agreements, and an enormous number of Russian Jews have
immigrated to Israel. The connection is undeniable, though the two seem unlikely allies,
especially as Israel remains resolutely planted in the hands of the United States. Israel’s
Western allies may be part of Putin’s attraction; Mark Katz suggests that most of Russia’s
foreign policy is, “actually predicated on a desire to spite the Americans.”36 In other words,
Putin may favor Israel because it can be used as a political tool against Western Europe and
the United States.
Some experts suggest that Russia’s tilt toward Israel has to do with the two states’
similar hardline policies towards perceived terrorism. For example, the Chechnya region of
Russia has held multiple revolutions, leading various Russian leaders to invade and take
military action. Yeltsin invaded the region to squash the revolt in 1994, and Putin did so in the
late 1990s.37 Most of the Western world has spoken aggressively against these actions, but
Israel has vocally supported Putin’s policy of “not negotiating with terrorists and defeating
them militarily instead.”38 Israel may see similarities between the Russian issue with the
Chechens and their own “issue” with Palestine, Hamas, and the PLO, thus leading Israel to
35

Jared Feldschreiber, “An Alliance of Necessity: Putin’s Russia Enjoys a Strategic Partnership With Israel,”
Berggruen Institute on Governance’s The World Post, 1 July 2014.
36
Katz, “Putin’s Pro-Israel Policy,” 57.
37
Freedman, “Russia and Israel under Yeltsin,” 144.
38
Katz, “Putin’s Pro-Israel Policy,” 58.
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continue relations and have increased sympathy for Russia. As few countries appreciate
Moscow’s realpolitik and frequent military interventions, Israel’s role as an ally that approves
has become important to Russian domestic and foreign politics. A poignant example of this
importance came in January 2004 when Russia abstained from a United Nations vote
condemning a security barrier Israel had constructed between Israel and the disputed
territories.39 Moscow feared the implications of the vote for its barriers in Chechnya. By
protecting itself, Russia also inadvertently supported Israel.
A similar situation arose with Russia’s March 2014 annexation of Crimea. Few states
approved of Russia’s move, though Israel stayed mysteriously quiet. If Israel condemned
Russia, as the United States was urging Jerusalem to do, the government would also be
convicting its own actions with Palestinian land.40 Israel took a neutral stance, neither for nor
against Russia, though silence was a sufficient indicator. Israel was purposefully absent for
the 27 March 2014 United Nations vote which officially condemned Russia’s annexation.41
The absentee decision has become economically beneficial for Israel, as trade between Russia
and Israel has increased since the Crimean annexation. When the EU, United States,
Australia, Canada, and Norway began sanctions, Moscow banned certain food products from
these countries.42 Israel has taken up this trade gap by largely increasing its exports of fruit to
Russia. Additionally, both Israel and India have been approved to begin importing meat and
dairy products into Russia.43 These agreements mean more money for Israel, security for

39

Katz, “Putin’s Pro-Israel Policy,” 55.
Feldschreiber, “An Alliance of Necessity.”
41
Azriel Bermant, “Israel should beware ally Russia,” The Jewish Chronicle Online, 23 September 2014.
42
“Russia to import meat and dairy products from Israel.” Food Processing Technology, 29 October 2014.
43
Ibid.
40
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Russia, and a stronger alliance against Western European will. Before these changes, RussianIsraeli bilateral trade was worth over two billion USD.44
Cultural diplomacy has also increased under Putin’s leadership. When Putin first
visited Israel in 2005, the trip was highly publicized and aimed primarily at awareness of both
Russian and Israeli people. Putin made symbolic trips to multiple holocaust memorials and
met Russian Jews who fought in World War II.45 He also met with multiple Russian-Jewish
émigrés; one of these was his old schoolteacher whom now lives in Israel. Anti-Semitism in
Russia has decreased slightly since the 1990s46, though only because the number of Jews
remaining in Russia is a mere shadow of what it used to be: only 230,000 Jews live in
Russia.47 The cultural sensitivity during his visit, therefore, was used as a platform for Putin
to discuss his protection of all Russian Jews, as well as his plans to combat anti-Semitism in
Russia.48 The visit, as seems a trend in Russian politics, was a combination of Russian
domestic and international realpolitik. More recently, Israel transferred an area called the
Sergei Courtyard, which was previously part of a compound belonging to the Moscow
patriarchy, back to Russia. This 2008 move was an act of cultural acceptance and goodwill.49
Moscow has also established a Jewish museum.
As with the Gorbachev and Yelstin administrations, Putin is using Israel as a method
of penetrating the Middle East and achieving influence. Moscow’s attempt to be involved can
be described as acting as the “honest broker”50 in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Putin has visited
both Palestine and Israel to show legitimacy, as well as invited envoys from both
44

Dorit Goldender, “Russia and Israel: Strategic Partners that Sing the Same Folk Songs,” 120.
“A Hazy Landmark.”
46
Alex Safronsky, interview by Megan Bailey, 12 November 2014.
47
Katz, “Putin’s Pro-Israel Policy,” 57.
48
“A Hazy Landmark.”
49
“Vladimir Putin and the Holy Land; Russia, Israel, and the Middle East,” The Economist 406 (2013): 54.
50
“A Hazy Landmark.”
45
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administrations to Moscow for peace talks. Carefully toeing the line, Russia has even offered
to replace Palestinian helicopters that have been damaged in various conflicts and sell the
Palestinian Authority armored vehicles.51 However, both groups seem to appreciate Russia’s
involvement. Palestinian President Abbas referred to Russia as “our precious friend and
comrade,”52 while multiple Israeli leaders have incredibly positive personal and diplomatic
relationships with President Putin. Former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon referred to Putin as a
“true friend,” and this claim seems truthful as Ariel Sharon’s family emigrated from Russia
and he and Putin often spoke fluent Russian together.53
Israel has reservations about Russia’s continuing relationship with other Arab
countries, specifically Syria and Iran. In Syria, Russia has continued selling a multitude of
weapons, including missiles, which Israel fears may end up in the hands of Hezbollah or other
terror organizations.54 However, Russia has continually assured Israel, to no avail, that the
Syrian arms are short-range only, implying Israel is safe from threat. Russia has also
outwardly promoted Iran’s nuclear program, including vocal support and supplying both
funds and technology for the endeavor. Moscow has claimed that the “nuclear sector sales to
Iran are vital to the survival of the Russian atomic energy industry,”

55

so the sales have

continued despite Israel’s discomfort. Israel remains the biggest advocate for far-reaching
sanctions against Iran and, and as the Israeli ambassador to Russia recently suggested,
“sometimes defensive weapons can become offensive weapons.”56 Russia shows no signs of
slowing relations with either Syria or Iran.

51

Ibid.
“A Hazy Landmark.”
53
Katz, “Putin’s Pro-Israel Policy,” 58.
54
Noel Howell, interview by Megan Bailey, 9 November 2014.
55
Katz, “Putin’s Pro-Israel Policy,” 52.
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Goldender, “Russia and Israel: Strategic Partners that Sing the Same Folk Songs,” 124.
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Overall, Israel’s current pursuit of a steady relationship with Russia may be attributed
to four major components. First, Russia has provided first a flood, and then a steady flow of
immigrants since opening the borders in the late 1980s. As a small and new country, new,
highly skilled citizens are necessary for growth. Next, Russia provides Israel with oil and,
therefore, energy security. In the future, energy and water security will be some of the biggest
Israeli existential crises, so this security is imperative.57 Third, though Israel fears Russia’s
relationship with other Middle Eastern states, Israel hopes their alliance with Moscow may act
as a buffer in future conflicts. As Moscow hoped, Russia may have the opportunity to play a
strong, negotiator role in the Middle East. Finally, over one-fifth of the Israeli population is
Russian émigrés.58 A majority of these men and women still have connections to Russia and
their families; positive relations with Russia mean a pleased population in Israel.
For Russia, the relationship is focused on pragmatism and money. Realistically,
Russia still plays realpolitik, Putin’s specialty, and the Middle East is an essential region in
world politics. To have some semblance of presence in the region, Russia must partner with as
many states and governments as possible. In the case of any conflict, Russia wants to have as
many allies as possible. As Israel has traditionally embraced the West, Russia’s infiltration of
the Israeli government seems promising as a path to Western Europe and the White House.
Second, the relationship with Israel provides Russia with a valuable trading partner and a
large amount of wealth. Israel buys Russian oil and the two trade a variety of other products.
The revenue created from bilateral trade is essential for Russia, too. For both Israel and
Russia, full diplomatic and economic relations have proved worthwhile.

57
58

Goodarzi, 11 November 2014.
Howell, 9 November 2014.
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The Russian Diaspora
In the creation of Israel, one of the main purposes was to make a state “open to Jewish
immigration and the Ingathering of Exiles.”59 On 5 July 1950, Israel enacted the Law of
Return, which essentially gives every Jew the right to immigrate to Israel. Though the Soviet
Union absorbed over two million Jews during World War II, none were allowed to immigrate
to Israel; the Russian government had declared the Jews under otkaznik, meaning they were
not permitted to leave the country. This situation continued until Gorbachev declared glasnost
and perestroika in the 1980s.60 Before then, fewer than one thousand Russian Jews had gotten
to Israel.
After relations began to improve, however, Russia’s immigration floodgates opened.
Over one million Russian Jews have arrived at Israel’s borders since 1989, increasing Israel’s
population by close to eighteen percent.61 Gideon Lichfield illustrated this concept best:
“imagine the United States absorbing France, that is the comparison made with Israel’s intake
of immigrants…from the collapsing Soviet Union.”62 This number of immigrants is
enormous, especially considering that each of these immigrants must find a home, job,
community, and establish ties with Israeli culture. Assimilating a flood of people is not easy,
though the Soviet/Russian diaspora remains in Israel. In Russia, just above 200,000 Jews
remain, merely a shadow of the previous population. From the most recent numbers, it
appears that about one-fifth of the Israeli population is émigrés from the Soviet Union or
Russia.63 As the first generation came during the 1990s, Israel is just beginning to experience
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the first generation of children with Russian-Jewish heritage, but born in Israel. Israel survives
on immigrants bringing new ideas, skills, and economic demand. In the grand scheme, the
Russian immigration has benefited Israel.
Migration has become part of transnationalism, a concept of globalization in which
nations can reach farther than states’ borders. Due to transnationalism, as well as the waves in
which these Russian-Jewish immigrants came, most have maintained ties with their homeland
and their language.64 The sheer size of the Russian population caused whole Russian towns
and villages to appear in Israel. Integration is unnecessary for these migrants, as they can
speak Russian and find a community with all the comforts of home without becoming Israeli.
Still, surveys report that over sixty percent of immigrants say their dressing styles, eating
habits, and other cultural markers have drifted towards Israeli patterns.65 These immigrants
also brought their media with them, an additional way in which to stay connected with the
Russian network. There are over thirty local and national Russian newspapers and magazines,
as well as numerous radio and television channels and films.
The Russian-Jewish diaspora has also permeated the Israeli political structure. As
these immigrants have full citizenship in Israel, they vote in elections and tend to be quite
active in the political process. In Alex Safronsky’s words, the Russian-Jewish voters tend to
be right wing and “hawkish,” more traditional than the standard Israeli.66 This group has
formed a kind of ethnic political party, Israel ba-Aliyah, which effectively lobbies for the
interests of Russian immigrants.67 Israel ba-Aliyah has formed blocs with other right wing
parties; this strategy was successful in 2013 when the group led the polls. This immigrant
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political party and the subsequent bloc has held major influence on the coalition government
of Prime Minister Netanyahu.68 Russian Jews themselves have climbed the ranks, enjoying
leadership positions in the Israeli military structure and Israeli politics. For example, Avigdor
Lieberman has served multiple roles in the Israeli government. Now, he is Israel’s Minister of
Foreign Affairs and leans heavily towards friendly relations with Russia.69 Lieberman was
born in the Soviet Union, served in the Red Army, exiled to Siberia, and then immigrated to
Israel. Numerous other political leaders share his Soviet heritage.
The Russian diaspora has not assimilated perfectly into Israeli culture; there have been
numerous problems with this group. First, the Russian immigrants are generally poorer than
the Israelis and tend to face difficulties in finding work.70 The skills they learned and jobs
they held in the Soviet Union and Russia are incongruent with the current structural
opportunities in Israel. Though the immigrants are generally highly educated, they still face
difficulties in securing permanent work. Second, Israelis do not regard the Russian
immigrants highly; the Russian Jews are generally stereotyped as criminals and cultural
snobs. This stereotype may be caused by a cultural superiority the Russians feel over the
Jews.71 The Russian homeland has been the center of empires, as well as part of the high
European culture. The immigrants feel as though they are part of something bigger, something
better than the upstart, technically history-less Israel.
The largest tension between the Russian Jews and the Israelis has been the perceived
“Jewishness” of the immigrant group. The Law of Return applied to all Jews even if they
were married to someone with one Jewish grandparent, which is a rather wide consideration
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of Judaism.72 In addition, most of the Russians Jews are secular, being ethnically but not
religiously Jewish. They do not speak Hebrew and are generally weary of Zionism. Some
Israelis believe that the Russian are diluting the “Jewishness” of Israel, that they have created
an “erosion of Israel’s Jewish definition.”73 The Russian immigrants are often referred to as
non-Zionists and sometimes treated as second-class citizens. For example, the law states that
only Orthodox Jews may be married in Israel, thus the immigrants must leave the country to
be married or be married by mail.74 The non-Jewish, Russian subculture has caused additional
problems to the perceived Jewish culture. First, the growing economy has attracted the
Russian mafia, which now launders money in Israel against Israeli will.75 Next, the Russian
groups have established their own communities that have specific restaurants and stores, most
of which do not keep Kosher. This small change has become a bigger irritation for religious
Jews who live nearby. In the near future, Israel will need to grapple with the tension between
secular and religious Jews.
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Strategic Partnerships
Israel and Russia have cultivated their relationship beyond the political realm. These
strategic partnerships cater to each of the state’s strengths, enhancing their bond and
increasing their security in the relationship. First, Israel is considered a world superpower in
military technology. Moscow has recognized the potential, inquiring into numerous
collaborative military deals with Israel.76 Russia began buying drones from Israel in 2009 and
was quite pleased with the result; Moscow ordered an additional thirty-six drones later in the
year.
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future military development and purchases between the two states. The largest deal, however,
came just a month later when Israel Aerospace Industries signed a 400 million USD contract
with Russia’s state-owned Oboronprom for the creation of spy drones.78 The Russian
company will utilize Israel intelligence and design to produce the drones in Russia.
Russia has also called Israel a world power in the space and space technology fields.79
Israel has reduced the size and weight of their satellites and have a singular unique practice:
they launch their satellites westward, against the pull of Earth’s revolution, while all other
space programs launch satellites eastward. Russia has sought to capitalize on these
innovations, signing a space cooperation agreement in 2011. The agreement is far-reaching,
including “areas like astrophysical and planetary research, space biology and medicine,
navigational satellites and launching services, and other technology.”80 Russia hopes to send a
manned mission to Mars by 2035, and Israel seems to be Moscow’s most likely ally in
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accomplishing this task. Israel has also shared on Russia’s nuclear technology, including
medical breakthroughs and dental imaging.
Israel and Russia are also linked through energy cooperation. This part of their
alliance is vital; energy security is becoming more and more crucial, and their connection is
essential for the Russian energy market and for Israel’s peace of mind. In fact, Russia is
Israel’s largest supplier of crude oil.81 With the increasing problems between the European
Union and Russia, the Middle East, especially Israel, has become a more viable market for
Russia. As of February 2013, Moscow has also invested in Israeli liquefied natural gas, a
future boom in the energy game.82 The Russians have already advanced loans worth over 3.5
billion USD for excavation of the Tamar and Dalit fields, just offshore of Israel. Russian
money has become essential to this Israeli project, and Israel is happy to oblige in the
permanent energy partnership. At the beginning of 2014, Russia and Israel began talks about a
contract for join renewable energy research as well.
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Russia, Israel, and Geopolitics
The Israeli-Russo relationship has implications beyond the two states. As Russia has
made a point of becoming involved in the Middle East, Moscow has significantly impacted
the region’s geopolitics. As discussed earlier, Russia has created a number of “friends” in the
Middle East: Israel, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, among others.83 All things considered,
Russia has balance these relationships fairly well considering the tensions between multiple
countries in the Middle East. Russia’s alliances range from technological, like Iraq, military,
like Syria, commercial, like Turkey, or some other combination. Essentially, Russia has made
the Middle East dependent on its participation in regional politics. Moscow supports the
economies of Middle Eastern countries and plays the “good cop” to the West’s “bad cop” in
many situations.84
Though not located in the Middle East, Russia has done its best to become an
important player in the Arab-Israeli conflict. For example, Russia has loudly described itself
as the honest broker between the two sides, hoping to become indispensible to both the Arab
nations and Israel.85 Putin has visited Israel multiple times now and both sends and receives
diplomatic envoys from the Israeli government.86 However, Moscow has also received leaders
from the Palestinian side, including the Palestinian Labour Organization and Hamas. Russia
typically sympathizes with the Palestinian perspective in United Nations’ votes and has
replaced helicopters destroyed in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.87 Still, Israel has made few
complaints about Russia’s “double agent” role. As per his goal, Putin has made his
government indispensible in the peace process. Because the Middle East is such a volatile
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region, whatever country or whoever’s government can manage to mitigate tension will have
power on the global stage: Russia’s end goal.
The United States should also be concerned of the geopolitical implications of
Russia’s influence in the Middle East. As many experts have described, Israel has always
been tucked firmly in the United States’ pocket,88 allied with the West. Israel’s relationship
with Russia challenges this perception. This effect was already seen in the condemnation of
the Crimean annexation; Western Europe and the United States pressured Israel to condemn
Russia’s actions, but Israel was conveniently absent from the United Nations vote doing so.89
This example is not completely telling, though it does show the interesting position that Israel
has been placed in, balancing the support of, arguably, two world powers who do not have
good relations. Western Europe’s sanctions were Israel’s gain, so there may even be an
incentive for Israel to hope for tension between its two allies.
Russia’s relationship with Israel allows Putin and Moscow leverage of the United
States. As Freedman described, “by maintaining good ties with Israel, Russia apparently
hopes to keep an open door to the White House even when Russian-American ties become
strained.”90 The alliance between Russia and Israel means the United States must consider its
future in the Middle East and how it will market itself as a broker in the Israeli-Arab peace
process, among other relevant Middle Eastern issues. Moscow has made many more Middle
Eastern connections that the United States and has better geographic proximity, which means
Russia may make a better ally in time-sensitive situations. Overall, both Russia and the
United States are utilizing the Middle East in an attempt to define and sustain their
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geopolitical power on a global scale. Both states often have the same goal, but differ in their
methodology.
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Prospective
As the last component of my research, I would like to explore two future scenarios for
the relationship between Russia and Israel. First, the possibility of the West and Israel turning
away from each other; second, the possibility of Moscow’s complete turn towards the Arab
Middle Eastern countries.
The West turning completely from Israel seems highly unlikely, as the United States
would find a difficult time ignoring Israel and their past relationship, as well as the loud
Israeli lobby in Washington. However, some Western European countries have been more
receptive to the idea of Palestine; consider Sweden as it has recently diplomatically
recognized Palestine.91 If this situation did occur, Israel would certainly turn to Russia as its
protector, and most likely face additional pressure in reaching a deal with the Palestinians. If
Israel did concede to the pressure, Russia would delight in this situation. Both Israel and
Palestine would be likely to choose Russia to serve in a mediating capacity, further increasing
Russia’s involvement in the Middle East. Additionally, Moscow could claim credit when
some semblance of an agreement was reached.92 Regardless, economic, technological, and
diplomatic ties with Israel would continue for as long as Russia saw beneficial for its own
needs.
The second situation, Russia abandoning the relationship with Israel, is also unlikely
due to the cultural and economic relationships between the two. However, if Russia were to
streamline their Middle Eastern approach to only Arab nations, Israel would suffer more than
Russia. As Russia provides energy as well as a trade market for the Israelis, the termination of
the alliance would be quite harmful. If this situation were to occur, Israel would still be
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pressured into reaching an agreement with the Palestinians, though Russia would be the party
doing a majority of the pressuring. Russia would struggle very little and have fewer restraints
in supplying Iran, Iraq, and Syria, as well as helping to arm the Palestinians. Still, Russia
would face continued, and possibly stronger, opposition from Western Europe and the United
States, as the West would surely continue their embrace of Israel. This situation is, perhaps, as
unlikely as the first, though would certainly change the dynamics in the Middle East.
In the end, the most likely scenario for the future of the alliance is continued growth as
is. Israel will continue to be allied with the West, while having a soft spot for Russia and
Putin. Moscow will continue to build relationships with multiple states in the Middle East
while holding Israel in a distinct position. The alliance between the two will grow, to the
dismay of the West, though there will be no interference. When the time comes for an ArabIsraeli peace, I believe Russia will play a large role in mediating the conflict.
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Conclusion
From Israel’s beginning in the 1940s, the Israeli-Russo relationship has been
complicated and multi-faceted. Despite the Soviet Union’s prevalent role in Israel’s creation,
ties soon disintegrated and did not fully return until the 1990s. Since Yeltsin came to power,
Russia and Israel have enjoyed a swiftly growing relationship that includes economic,
cultural, technological, environmental, and energy diplomacy. Israel and Russia are connected
in numerous, permanent ways. Russians even make up close to fifteen percent of the Israeli
population. The alliance is undeniable, though it has largely been ignored by both academia
and other states.
Israel-Russo relations have implications beyond Israel and Russia’s borders. Their
alliance has affected politics across the Middle East, as well as in the United States and, to
some degree, Western Europe. Their current diplomatic ties are relatively new, having
developed within the past twenty-five years, but are sure to grow and become more
complicated as time goes on. Russia enjoys relations with multiple countries in the Middle
East, and Israel enjoys strong relations with the West. Still, their contradictory positions
function to create an incredible strategic alliance between the two.
It is clear that Russia will continue to play a large role in the Middle East, including in
Israel. The alliance is strategic, strong, and growing. Overall, the relationship between Israel
and Russia seems unlikely and complicated, but must be considered in an accurate analysis of
Middle Eastern geopolitics and the state of global power.
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